Cost-benefit Analysis of Climate Change: Stern Revisited by Baer, Paul & Spash, Clive L.
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Cost-benefit Analysis of Climate Change:
Stern Revisited
Baer, Paul and Spash, Clive L.
CSIRO
May 2008
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/101829/
MPRA Paper No. 101829, posted 15 Jul 2020 09:23 UTC
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF 
CLIMATE CHANGE: STERN 
REVISITED 
 
 
Paul Baer and Clive L. Spash 
S
oc
io
-E
co
no
m
ic
s 
an
d 
th
e 
E
nv
iro
nm
en
t i
n 
D
is
cu
ss
io
n 
 
C
S
IR
O
 W
or
ki
ng
 P
ap
er
 S
er
ie
s 
  2
0
0
8
-0
7
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
May 2008 
ISSN:  1834-5638 
 
                                                 
Cost-Benefit Analysis of Climate Change: Stern Revisited 
Paul Baer1 and Clive L. Spash2 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper explores the challenges facing orthodox economic approaches to 
assessing climate control as if it were appraisal of an investment project.  Serious 
flaws are noted in the work of economists with especial attention to the UK 
Government report by Stern and colleagues. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The threat of anthropogenic climate change raises numerous complex problems, but 
the issue is mainly framed as the need to cut global greenhouse gas emissions with 
often exclusive emphasis on carbon dioxide (CO2).  Environmental economists 
reduce the decision further to a monetary cost-benefit analysis (CBA), in which the 
costs of controlling greenhouse gas emissions are balanced against the benefits of 
avoiding induced climatic related damages to human welfare.  CBA climate 
professionals then claim an ability to calculate ‘optimal’ long-term policy choices.  
Such use of CBA, especially for global-scale problems, has been called into question 
on a variety of grounds by people inside (Vatn and Bromley, 1994; Vatn, 2000; 
Spash, 2002b, 2007a, 2007b) and outside (Sagoff, 1988; O'Neill, 1993; O'Neill, 
1997) the economics profession. 
Historically, CBA was developed to evaluate well defined small-scale projects.  
Even at such a project level there is often scepticism relating to the necessary 
simplifications and assumptions.  In particular, a host of controversial ethical choices 
are required because of the incommensurability of costs and benefits, the possibility 
of appropriate compensation, accounting for future generations and non-human 
species, income inequality and the distribution of rights.  The enormous uncertainties 
surrounding the relationship between causes of climate change, their potential 
impact and valuation raise additional challenges.  At the global and multi-century 
scale the mismatch between the claims of robust and objective measurement and 
the realities of subjective and uncertain projection become profound.  Yet, despite 
the considerable range and number of serious critiques, the CBA approach remains 
influential and continues to be applied to the debate over preventing human induced 
climate change. 
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The most recent example is the so-called Stern Review (SR) (Stern, 2006a), 
an economic analysis commissioned by the UK Government and chaired by Sir 
Nicholas Stern, a former chief economist at the World Bank.  This report, released in 
October 2006 with a good deal of fanfare, is known primarily for its headline 
message that straightforward economic (cost-benefit) analysis justifies “prompt and 
strong action” to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.  The SR favours stabilization of 
greenhouse gas concentrations at between 450 and 550 parts per million (ppm) CO2 
equivalent with a target of 500 to 550 ppm CO2 equivalent said to be achievable at a 
cost of about 1% of gross domestic product (GDP); business as usual is estimated to 
cause losses of 5% to 20% of GDP.3  Prior to the SR, most climate CBA 
professionals produced numbers supporting little or no mitigation,4 while non-
economists and critics of CBA called for stringent mitigation.  The significance of the 
SR is that mainstream economists are found claiming that CBA “done properly” 
shows rapid and significant emissions reductions are economically warranted.5  
Professional climate economists have then felt the need to defend their own CBAs, 
and in particular their discounting of future harm (Mendelsohn, 2006; 
Nordhaus, 2006; Tol, 2006; Yohe, 2006).  The main claim is that wrong conclusions 
are drawn due to making non-standard assumptions about discounting and so 
valuing future impacts more highly than conventional in mainstream economics, 
i.e. in the critics’ own models. 
The resulting debate has focussed upon whether CBA does warrant a limit of 
550 ppm CO2 equivalent.  As a result the case for a limit at 450 ppm CO2 equivalent 
has been neglected.  This means effectively accepting global average temperature 
 
3
   The scenario was one selected from amongst those of the IPCC (SRES A2). 
4
   Cline, 1992, is the most prominent exception. 
5
   A mainstream economic argument for strong mitigation suits a neo-liberal leaning UK Labour 
government seeking to placate the business class. We return to the political context later. 
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increases above 2ºC, despite this being the limit previously endorsed by both the UK 
Government and European Commission.6  The SR and others then seem happy to 
use CBA to debate upper but not lower emissions limits.  This raises concerns both 
about the role of CBA in general and the quality of the SR’s analysis in particular, for 
deciding upon greenhouse gas control measures. 
The SR does express some humility and even scepticism concerning the 
ability of Integrated Assessment Models (linking emissions to economic losses) to 
produce precise quantified projections, saying at times that such calculations should 
be considered only “indicative”.  Indeed, the fact that damages are attributed such a 
large range (5 to 20%) makes uncertainty about the impacts of climate change — 
both their likelihood and their valuation — a central concern.  Thus a logical 
presumption would be that the choice of limits on emissions and so climate forcing 
was centrally determined by such uncertainties.  However, we show the SR’s own 
standards for addressing uncertainty and value controversy support neither the 
upper nor the lower bound with justifiable quantitative arguments. 
In the remainder of this paper, we consider how the SR conducts its 
quantitative analyses.  Four subjects will be addressed in turn, namely the treatment 
of: future generations, risk and uncertainty, extreme and catastrophic impacts, and 
intra-generational ethics.  These areas reflect the ways in which the SR claims to be 
innovative.  We then discuss the issues raised by the reduction of all future climate 
damages to a single indicator of expected utility.  We conclude with an assessment 
of whether the quantitative results are sufficiently robust to justify the policy 
                                                 
6
   The SR acknowledges that stabilization at 450 ppm CO2 equivalent offers at best a roughly even 
chance of keeping global mean temperature increase below 2ºC, with a significant (order of 20%) 
likelihood of an increase over 3ºC.  The SR suggests fairly strongly that achieving 450 ppm CO2 
equivalent is already too expensive to be “worth” the extra risk reduction it accomplishes but does not 
rule it out. 
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conclusions and some interpretation of the role of the SR in the current climate policy 
context. 
One background for our analysis is the framework of “post-normal science”.  
Funtowicz and Ravetz (1994) used this approach to critique global CBA estimates of 
climate change control by Nordhaus (1991b; 1991a).  They showed that, in spite of 
appeals to various tenets of theory and economic estimates to several decimal 
places of accuracy, Nordhaus produced results on the basis of ad-hoc assumptions, 
educated guesses and controversial value judgments.  Funtowicz and Ravetz (1994) 
focused on many of the same issues — scientific uncertainty, discounting of future 
generations, the valuation of impacts — that the SR highlights to differentiate itself 
from Nordhaus and others.  However, the PAGE2002 model used by the SR is 
directly related to the model developed by Nordhaus and, in addition the similar 
basic methodology means identical problems despite the attempted differentiation. 
A key aspect of what follows is to show that the SR’s argument for 
stabilization at 550 ppm lacks quantitative economic justification.  Subtly different 
modelling choices allow a case for more stringent mitigation of 450 ppm or even 
lower.  Precisely because the numbers are so pliable, they fail to show that lower 
targets are economically unwarranted.  In addition, non-economic arguments are 
centrally important and the expression of plural incommensurable values essential in 
the policy debate.  Thus for many, a highly persuasive argument exists due to the 
expected physical impacts under “business as usual” and the resulting inequitable 
distribution and imposition of harm on the innocent. 
THE SR’s CBA ARGUMENT 
Two main arguments are made in support of the SR’s policy recommendations.  First 
is a justification of targets using a comparison of the marginal costs and benefits of a 
4 
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single ton of CO2 equivalent emissions.  Second is the assertion that the likely 
damages from business as usual can be equated to a GDP loss of 5% to 20%, while 
control costs equate to 1% of GDP to stabilize atmospheric greenhouse gases at 
500 to 550 ppm CO2 equivalent which is claimed to avoid “most of the worst 
impacts”. 
The first argument relates to the theoretical holy grail of CBA.  If an analyst 
could define and equalize the costs with the benefits of reducing a ton of carbon they 
would be able to meet the conditions for defining the ‘optimal’ point for efficient 
pollution emissions reduction.  In the SR the comparisons are actually never made 
explicitly.  However, in Chapter 10 (with estimates based on Grubb, Carraro and 
Schellnhuber, 2006), the SR reports that the marginal costs of emissions reductions 
for a 450 ppm CO2 stabilization pathway (equivalent to around 500 to 550 ppm CO2 
equivalent) are around $27 per ton CO2 (±50%) in 2030 and around $15 to $70 per 
ton CO2 in 2050.7  The benefits of control are reported as being in the order of $85 
per ton of CO2 equivalent for business as usual, versus about $30 per ton if 
concentrations are stabilized at 550 ppm CO2 equivalent, and $25 per ton if 
concentrations are stabilized at 450 ppm CO2 equivalent.8  Taking these numbers at 
face value shows ambiguous support for even the 550 ppm upper limit. 
The second argument is supposed to provide a relatively self-evident choice 
in favour of the 550 ppm target.  However, as Mendelsohn (2006) has pointed out, 
this ignores the possibility that stabilization at, say, 650 ppm might also avoid “most 
of the worst impacts” and have much lower mitigation costs.  By the SR’s own 
                                                 
7 
  Note that the actual figures reported in the SR (Stern, 2006a: 248) are incorrectly converted from 
tons C to tons CO2, resulting in numbers that are too high by a factor of 13! 
8
  
 The SR reports on the “Social Cost of Carbon” which is highly misleading terminology (on 
manipulation of cost terminology see Spash, 2002b: 172-177); this is actually referring to the marginal 
benefits of greenhouse gas reduction, and should not be confused with emissions control costs. 
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admission, picking a stabilization target which is to be defended on grounds of 
welfare economics still requires a comparison of marginal costs and benefits.  Thus 
the SR states: 
“Our work with the PAGE model suggests that, allowing for uncertainty, 
if the world stabilises at 550ppm CO2e, climate change impacts could 
have an effect equivalent to reducing consumption today and forever 
by about 1.1%.  As Chapter 6 showed, this compares with around 11% 
in the corresponding ‘business as usual’ case — ten times as high.  
With stabilisation at 450ppm CO2e, the percentage loss would be 
reduced to 0.6%, so choosing the tougher goal ‘buys’ about 0.5% of 
consumption now and forever. Choosing 550ppm instead of 650ppm 
CO2e ‘buys’ about 0.6%.” (Stern, 2006a: 295). 
Note here that the authors claim that the “marginal benefits” of moving from 650 to 
550 ppm and 550 to 450 ppm are roughly the same — in both cases about half a 
percent of GDP “now and forever”.  This implies that the mitigation cost of moving 
from 650 to 550 ppm would have to be less than half a percent of GDP for 550 ppm 
to be clearly warranted on economic efficiency grounds.  Yet in one table, the SR 
shows reductions of approximately this scale (some mismatch occurs because of the 
conversion of CO2 to CO2 equivalent levels) leading to costs at mid-century on the 
order of 1 to 4% of GDP (Stern, 2006a: 297, Table 13.4), and (in another table based 
on another meta-analysis), leading to discounted equivalent costs on the order of 
0.3-0.8% (Stern, 2006a: 296, Table 13.3).  Thus the marginal benefit of reducing 
CO2 equivalent from 650 to 550 ppm is not plainly larger than the cost. 
This shows that the quantitative analyses behind the policy recommendations 
are of questionable robustness, even at the level of the use of the numbers 
6 
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calculated.  There is then good reason to be sceptical that monetary conversion and 
aggregation of impacts, and the appeal to “state of the art” economic methods, 
actually can provide justification for policy recommendations.  In addition, the case 
for setting a lower threshold of 450 ppm CO2 equivalent remains open and may be 
as, or more, desirable on several grounds. 
FUTURE GENERATIONS 
The long time scale of human induced climate change makes the question of our 
ethical responsibilities to future generations central to the framing of the problem.  In 
economic analysis, this debate is centred on the concept of discounting.  This is the 
practice of reducing the value of future costs and benefits in proportion to their 
distance in the future, typically through the use of an exponential discount rate (for 
more detailed discussion in the context of climate change see Spash, 1993; 2002a). 
There is a consensus among philosophers—and some economists—that the 
economic practice of discounting can lead to a dangerous disregard for the well-
being of future generations.  There is an extensive literature on ethical issues 
relating to future generations which raises concerns over intergenerational justice, 
the role of rights and responsibilities and the standing of future as opposed to 
present individuals.9  No such literature is cited in the SR, making its claim to be a 
“review” rather implausible.  Although this merely perpetuates the failure of public 
discourse to address the ethical implications of multi-generational environmental 
problems.  The fundamental reason for concern is straightforward: for any positive 
discount rate, a time in the future can be specified at which the effective destruction 
of civilization would be literally “not worth preventing”.  The high discount rates 
                                                 
9
   There is a considerable literature (eg. Callahan, 1981; d'Arge, Schulze and Brookshire, 1982; 
Norton, 1982; Barry, 1983; Page, 1983; Parfit, 1983; Parfit, 1984; Page, 1988; Howarth, 1997; O'Neill, 
1999; Gardiner, 2006) 
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typically used in climate CBAs mean that the importance of global catastrophe just a 
few decades in the future is vastly reduced in present decisions, and those in a 
century or more are effectively written–off completely. 
The SR recognizes that the choice of a discount rate (or perhaps more 
appropriately, a discounting model) is inescapably normative.  In the mainstream 
debate within economics, the key question is whether the economic analyst should 
include a “pure rate of time preference” as a component in the discount rate.  In 
general, mainstream economists accept the validity of a pure time preference and 
then debate the size of the rate.  Despite numerous qualifications, and claims which 
seem to undermine the practice, the SR does exactly the same.  Conventional 
welfare economics takes for granted that commodity discounting—reducing the 
importance of future costs or benefits in proportion to the (assumed) increased 
consumption of future generations—is well justified.  Indeed, commodity discounting 
is based on the assumption of declining marginal utility from consumption which is 
itself treated as a self evident fact requiring no proof. 
The SR uses a standard formula for combining the pure rate of time 
preference and the declining marginal utility of income to define the discount rate r:  
(1)  r = δ + ηg  
where δ (delta) is the rate of pure time preference, g is the growth rate of per capita 
consumption, and η (eta) determines the effect of economic (consumption) growth 
on the discount rate.  The parameter η is also characterized as an “inequality 
aversion” parameter in the SR, because of the way it is derived from the elasticity of 
the marginal utility of consumption.  The higher the value of η the greater the weight 
given to impacts on persons with lower consumption or income levels.  Importantly, 
as we discuss below, η is also characterized as a “risk aversion” parameter. 
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The dominant convention in CBA has been to use a relatively high discount 
rate (eg. 5% to 10%).  This includes, explicitly or implicitly, a significant positive pure 
rate of time preference (eg. 2% to 3%).  The term η is typically set to 1.  The SR 
rejects such a high pure rate of time preference on ethical grounds, but then rather 
strangely reasserts a very small positive pure rate of time preference (0.1%), based 
on the probability that human civilization may cease to exist in a century.10  The SR 
uses η=1, although sensitivity analyses using higher values of η have been added 
post publication of the main report in an “appendix to the postscript”, as a response 
to critics.  Under η=1, the discount rate is equal to 0.1% plus the economic growth 
rate, which averages 1.3% annually between 2000 and 2200 in the SR’s baseline 
world without climate change (Stern, 2006a: 161).  Even using this relatively low 
rate, impacts which occur 200 years in the future have just 6% of their value 
compared to their occurring today. 
Discounting has some appeal as a way of representing certain types of 
properties in a quantitative way for lay and expert groups.  At an intuitive level for lay 
persons, the more you have the less it is valued (i.e., marginal utility of income 
declines), and people in industrialised economies have been led to expect increases 
in real income over time.  At a more theoretical level for experts, it fits into a family of 
models within which an ethical judgment (the relative value of consumption to 
different persons) can be reflected in a single parameter, and then (with a few 
additional assumptions) ‘calibrated’ on the basis of ‘empirical data’.  This ability to 
extract a rate from observations gives a supposed scientific objectivity that is 
employed to justify the policy consequences of using the selected parameter.  For 
the analyst then all normative aspects are dispelled by a claim that discounting is an 
                                                 
10
  In fact the SR appears to pick the 0.1% number and then use it to estimate what the likelihood of 
extinction must be! (Stern, 2006a: 46-47). 
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empirical fact which can be observed by an objective scientist regardless of any 
moral implications. 
The formula in the SR is standard in welfare economics, and it is a classic 
example of the way in which economics mixes ethical and empirical claims in the 
justification of particular calculations.  There are a range of problems with this whole 
approach.  First, economists ignore empirical reality which shows individuals can and 
do hold negative discount rates for some impacts and positive ones for others, eg. 
bringing forward harms and delaying pleasures (Lowenstein and Prelec, 1991).  
Second, there is no one discount rate in society and there are different rates for 
different groups, capitals, contexts and so on.  Third, different scenarios imply 
different rates, even in theory, which makes the rate endogenous to the climate 
change problem and its policy ‘solution’.  Fourth, merely observing something occurs 
as an empirical fact says nothing of its moral acceptability or repugnance, eg. people 
murder, rape, torture, commit genocide.  Fifth, adding in risk to discounting conflates 
separate issues and makes untenable assumptions as to the nature of uncertainty.  
In brief, the SR fails to seriously address the arguments against discounting and 
lacks any reasoning as to why, even if one accepts discounting, zero or negative 
rates are inappropriate. 
RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 
Uncertainty over future human induced climate change and impacts is a widely 
recognized major consideration affecting policy responses.  The SR acknowledges 
this in a variety of places and claims that their approach to the incorporation of risk 
and uncertainty gives an improved estimate of the overall damages compared to 
previous climate CBAs.  The authors discuss the relationship between risk and 
uncertainty referring to a variety of debates.  However, the fundamental methodology 
10 
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employed reduces strong uncertainty (eg. partial ignorance, social indeterminacy) to 
known probabilistic events.  There are also questionable assumptions about the 
characteristics of the resulting risk calculations in terms of risk aversion and the 
treatment of utility. 
Economics and the related field of decision theory utilize an idealization of the 
problem of decision making under uncertainty in which actors — persons, firms, 
countries — are assumed to behave in such a way as to maximize “expected utility”.  
The approach integrates the probability that specific future states of the world will 
occur with the “utility” or welfare from the realisation of those states.  Underlying this 
is a set of conditions or axioms of assumed “rationality” which impose a very specific 
model of human behaviour.  There has actually been an extensive debate regarding 
whether persons do in fact act “rationally” in this sense, whether the model is 
fundamentally normative rather than descriptive, and if it is normative whether it is 
well justified.11  As a practical matter, there are plainly many cases where people fail 
to meet such expectations  (eg. Gintis, 2000).  This brings into question the case for 
arguing that behaviour can generally be described by simple notions which abstract 
from the complexity of individual behaviour and empirical reality. 
The approach also becomes messy very quickly because plausible future 
states of the world are so numerous (if not infinite).  Potential futures differ across 
multiple dimensions and different actors will vary in their valuation of alternative 
states.  Even if we assumed a finite number of possible outcomes, there is little 
reason to assume that there will be well-defined probabilities for those outcomes.  
Human induced climate change holds the prospect of large–scale unique changes 
outside human historical experience.  The standard scientific approach of repeated 
                                                 
11
  For a survey see Smithson (1989); for a collection of articles see Gärdenfors and Sahlin, (1988). 
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experiments to produce an “objective” probability distribution is then of no practicable 
use.  Rather the likelihood of some future state coming to pass is necessarily an 
opinion.  Perhaps a well justified opinion, perhaps a consensus opinion among a 
group, but an opinion nonetheless. 
The problem confronting natural and social scientists in their role as policy–
advisers is then how best to address this type of uncertainty.  One approach is to 
take ‘opinions’ and create probabilities of future events and essentially treat these as 
if they were derived from empirically observed experiments.  These subjective 
probabilities suffer from numerous problems not least of which is who has the right to 
have their opinion determine the weight given to possible future events? 
In terms of expected utility analysis a method is required to incorporate ‘loss 
aversion’ i.e., the recognized human preference to treat equivalent losses and gains 
asymmetrically.  The SR addresses these concerns about uncertainty and risk 
aversion using two primary methods.  First, a Monte Carlo model is used to create a 
probability density function (PDF) of climate outcomes and associated economic 
damages for a specified emissions pathway, based on 1000 “runs” of the model (on 
the model see Hope, 2006).  Second, a discount rate is employed in each run that 
varies with the “realized” rate of economic growth, after climate damages have been 
subtracted.  Because (as discussed above) the effective discount rate increases with 
economic growth, model runs with higher damages have lower discount rates.  As a 
consequence, those runs with higher damages are weighted more heavily in the 
aggregation of the multiple Monte Carlo runs, creating loss aversion in a stylized 
fashion. 
There are problems relating to both of these aspects.  The model 
(PAGE2002) requires subjective PDFs for over thirty crucial inputs, everything from 
12 
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the climate sensitivity to the ratio of climate damages in different regions in response 
to temperature increase.  In practice only climate sensitivity has any significant 
literature on an appropriate PDF; for the remainder, the authors simply use their 
judgment based on any available evidence, however scanty.12  Furthermore the 
PDFs used are triangular, which means there is zero probability of a value above or 
below some arbitrarily specified point. 
The SR acknowledges that the input PDFs are not well constrained, and 
indeed they address one aspect of this strong uncertainty by running their baseline 
climate scenario (the SRES A2 scenario) with alternative formulations of the carbon 
cycle feedback and possible methane releases.  This so-called “high climate” 
scenario leads to an increase in expected damages of about 35% (Stern, 2006a: 
154-155), and is an important contributor to the 5 to 20% range of reported 
damages.  They also run the model with an higher climate sensitivity PDF (the 
baseline PDF has a modal value of 2.5ºC and no possibility that it is higher than 
5.0ºC), although these results are reported only in a single place (Stern, 2006a: 156), 
are referred to as “particularly speculative”, and play no role in the decision analysis.  
In their sensitivity analyses, they use alternative PDFs for the primary damage 
function (Stern, 2006b: 7-10) although then essentially ignore the results. 
In a further gesture at the significance of strong uncertainty the SR discusses, 
in Chapter 2, a specific methodology for dealing with unknown probabilities leading 
to alternative calculations of expected utility.  Citing an unpublished paper by Henry 
(2006), the authors recommend taking a weighted average of the highest and lowest 
expected utilities, where the weights “would be influenced by concern of the 
individual about the magnitude of associated threats, or pessimism, and possibly any 
                                                 
12
  Hope (2006: 21) states that “Most parameter values are taken from the IPCC Third Assessment 
Report”, but it is evident that a great deal of subjective judgment went into converting the numbers 
into PDFs. 
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hunch about which probability might be more or less plausible”.  They conclude the 
discussion: “We now have a theory that can describe how to act” (Stern, 2006a: 34).  
Yet at the heart of the theory are concern, pessimism, and hunches. 
There are also good reasons to doubt the SR’s claim that the differential 
weighting of damages in an expected utility calculation, based ultimately on a 
parameter used to describe the declining marginal utility of consumption, is an 
adequate reflection of loss aversion.  This requires the assumption that the 
monetized valuation of all possible impacts captures everything we care about — 
impacts must be translated into equivalent monetized losses to count.  For example, 
risks of catastrophic species losses of 25% or even 50% or more would only enter 
the decision calculus inasmuch as one could put a monetary value on them. 
Finally, there is a very powerful normative assumption in the claim that policy 
should aim to maximize the expected value of a scenario — even if possible losses 
are weighted higher than possible gains — rather than, say, reducing the risk of 
crossing some threshold to an acceptably low level.  In theory almost any level of 
loss aversion could be “programmed” into a model like PAGE2002.  However, 
justifying the use of any particular function or parameter requires deciding in 
advance what risk of catastrophic outcomes should be accepted. 
EXTREME AND CATASTROPHIC IMPACTS 
The possibility of catastrophic impacts has been discussed in the context of possible 
states of the world or state changes called irreversible, non-linear or discontinuous.  
In most climate CBA models, there is at best a highly stylized inclusion of 
catastrophic events.  For example, Cline (1992) produced a central estimate of 
damages reaching 6% of GDP with a 10ºC warming, and 20% per cent of GDP lost 
under a pessimistic scenario.  He showed that, even with a 5% discount rate, 
14 
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incorporating only a small probability of catastrophe within such economic models is 
all that is required to justify “aggressive” action (Cline, 1992: 6).  In contrast, 
Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) estimated the ‘willingness to pay’ to avoid the risk of 
catastrophe by using a variety of ad-hoc adjustments to an expert survey carried out 
much earlier (Nordhaus, 1994).  They used this to justify equating a 2.5ºC warming 
to a 1% loss of GDP and a 6ºC warming to a 7% loss of GDP.  Even with the ad-hoc 
adjustment (a large component of their estimated damages) ‘optimal’ global 
temperature increase is calculated to be 2.44ºC above the 1900 level in 2105 (the 
end of the modelling horizon), just 0.09ºC below the business as usual base case, 
and still rising at 0.20ºC per decade. 
The SR explicitly lists and represents graphically several of the risks 
associated with catastrophic impacts — most notably the melting of ice sheets.  
However, this is then ignored.  Instead the PAGE2002 model used in the SR broadly 
follows Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) by including an aggregated probabilistic 
formulation in which, in every year of each model run, there is some probability 
(proportional to temperature) of extra GDP losses attributed to unspecified 
catastrophic impacts.  The incorporation of this calculation in the end has the simple 
effect of raising the expected damages at any particular temperature, and thus at 
any specified level of emissions.  The particular way in which the catastrophic 
damage function is calculated is necessarily quite arbitrary, as there is no well 
established basis for any such function or associated PDF. 
All the impacts are monetized, and are by assumption presumed to be 
impossible below a 2ºC increase, and never to exceed 20% of GDP lost in the “focal 
region”.  A scatter plot of model results reproduced in Warren et al. (2006) suggests 
that there is essentially a zero possibility of any impacts until temperature exceeds 
15 
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3ºC.  This is at best inconsistent with the scientific literature.  In the SR itself, a finite 
probability is attributed to the melting of the Greenland ice sheet even below 2ºC, 
with resulting several meter sea level rise.  However, an effectively zero probability is 
then used in the model.  This choice, whether conscious or not, shows that 
dangerously contentious and hidden value judgements are embedded within the 
mathematical analysis of catastrophic impacts.  This is a crucial example of how 
strong uncertainty is converted into weak uncertainty and impacts treated as some 
quasi-monetized risk. 
EQUITY AND DISTRIBUTION 
This section considers the distribution of costs and benefits within a generation 
(although the intergenerational issues are inextricably linked).  The premise of 
welfare economics is that the utility of different individuals can and must be 
aggregated to calculate the overall ranking of a possible state of the world or 
outcome.  This assumes that in comparing two specific outcomes, the gains to some 
persons can be directly added to the loss for others.  In the ideal world of economic 
theory, a social welfare function transforms specific gains or losses in utility to 
particular individuals into cardinal numbers. 
In models, such as PAGE2002, one or more “representative individuals” are 
used in the calculation.  Common formulae assume a declining marginal utility of 
consumption, which means that the marginal gain or loss from a unit consumed 
(measured in money) is “more valuable” to a poor person than a rich person.  Noting 
this and adjusting calculations to take it into account is known as equity weighting.  
Depending upon the function and parameters used to model the declining marginal 
utility of consumption, the relative impact on poor and rich of an equal amount of lost 
consumption can be larger or smaller. 
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Equity Weighting of the Benefits of Mitigation 
Most climate CBAs ignore equity weighting and therefore implicitly take the 
distribution of income in society as it stands as being justified.  This means if a 
person who lives on $2 a day or less loses $1 and a millionaire gains $2 the world is 
a better place.  The few studies which have included equity weighting have typically 
shown greater reductions to be warranted since standard damage assessments 
assert that poor regions will suffer greater proportional harm from anthropogenic 
climate change.  Two such studies which do include equity weighting are cited by the 
SR (Stern, 2006a: 156): Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) claim damages at 5ºC warming 
increase from about 6% to 8% of GDP, while Tol (2002) states damages at 5ºC 
double.13 
The SR asserts that equity weighting is appropriate.  In fact the model used is 
capable of providing regionally disaggregated damage estimates which could 
straightforwardly be used to calculate equity–weighted aggregate damages.  
However, the authors claim they lacked the time for such calculations.  Instead they 
simply assert, with a gesture at the two studies mentioned, that a reasonable 
estimate of the impact of equity weighting would raise the maximum expected 
damage estimate associated with business as usual from 14.4 to 20.0% of GDP.  
This shows that the results of the model are quite sensitive to the use of a stylized 
incorporation of equity.  Obviously the move to 20.0% of GDP has more to do with 
picking a nice round number rather than any specific and justifiable parameterization.  
The SR’s authors could just as easily have picked any number. 
                                                 
13
  In fact these numbers appear to be taken from a graph in the IPCC’s Third Assessment Report 
(Smith et al., 2001: Table 19.4) which is reproduced in the SR (Stern, 2006a: 147). The numbers on 
the equivalent graph (Fig. 4.3, p. 95) in Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) appear to be closer to 7% and 
8%, while the numbers from Tol’s study do not appear in the cited 2002 paper, but appear to be from 
a working-paper version of the same study used in the TAR. 
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If the SR had actually calculated equity weights this might have stimulated a 
debate over the numbers employed.  The SR might have shown, for example, that 
equity weighting increased business as usual damages from 14.4% to 19.7%.  Or 
perhaps, using different estimates for the relevant parameters, to anywhere from 
17.3% to 26.2%.  Or the equity weight could have followed Tol’s analysis which 
would have meant doubling the SR’s damage factors.  Such a debate would seem 
likely to have revealed the excessive precision being claimed on the basis of ad-hoc 
assumptions.  Wrongly precise and precisely wrong. 
There is then a direct parallel with the estimate of greenhouse gas control 
benefits presented by Nordhaus (1991b; 1991a) as criticised by Funtowicz and 
Ravetz (1994).  After presenting a table of numbers with as many as three significant 
digits on some figures and not even a clear sign on others, Nordhaus simply 
increased the total to 2% GDP loss (for a doubling of CO2) to account for his 
intuitions.  The SR follows Nordhaus in producing a figure with a calculated 
deceptive precision which is simply arbitrarily rounded up to another number. 
The idea of inequality aversion, described by a function or parameter, 
suggests that a collective social attitude towards inequality can be modelled, and 
appropriate functional forms and parameter values inferred from observable data.  
Hidden in this debate is a question about exactly what this weighting is supposed to 
mean, and how it is supposed to justify policy choices.  The methodology of welfare 
economics is prone to a relatively frequent slipping back and forth between 
ostensibly normative and empirical concepts.  The fact that an “equity” parameter 
can be set by the preferences of the modeller, seems to imply that the aggregate 
value of the outcome is simply an expression of the CBA climate experts concern, or 
lack of concern, over poverty. 
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Equity Weighing of the Costs of Mitigation 
In economic analysis of pollution control income inequality is generally taken as 
given, as if a natural consequence of life, while the distribution of mitigation costs is 
presumed to be a consequence of policy.  This would seem to make its analysis a 
self-evident requirement of policy design.  Strangely then the distributional impacts of 
mitigation costs are rarely modelled or even discussed. 
In any model assuming a declining marginal utility of consumption, the 
aggregate pollution control cost will be affected as much by distributional 
considerations as the aggregate benefits from pollution control (eg. climate change 
avoidance).  Mitigation costs can be made to appear arbitrarily small by distributing 
them to ever smaller and wealthier fractions of the population.  The welfare impacts 
of a policy that can be modelled as a tax (as climate mitigation can) tend toward zero 
as the tax is shifted towards the wealthiest fraction of the population. 
Countries such as the USA and Australia, which have opposed greenhouse 
gas emission control, tend to reflect a view that the wealthy should refuse a 
distribution of mitigation costs that burdens them disproportionately, even if it 
demonstrably minimizes global welfare losses.  Climate change economists are 
generally inconsistent in their analysis of this position.  They, as in the SR, assume 
that global welfare maximization can be an effective justification for the choice of a 
stabilization target, but not for the distribution of mitigation costs.  Yet, compared to 
control benefits, equity weighting might have a similar (or even greater) impact on 
the estimation of control costs to that for the estimation of control benefits.  As a 
result the actual emissions target being recommended would necessarily be different 
based upon the specific assumptions about the distribution of mitigation costs. 
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CBA LEGITIMACY AND EQUIVALENT CONSUMPTION LOSSES  
Key to understanding the SR’s argument for policy targets is understanding what the 
quantities measured as projected costs and benefits are intended to describe.  The 
central figures fail to represent a range of possible impacts, but rather give a range 
of “expected values” where a possible future in quasi-monetary terms is weighted 
according to its estimated likelihood.14  We refer to quasi-monetary terms because 
both consumption (proportional to future GDP) and welfare losses (from climate 
harm) are transformed by a mathematical operation into utility.  This move, which, as 
the SR authors note, is standard practice in applied economics, plays a variety of 
important roles in their analysis.  Utility is then further aggregated, discounted, and 
compared at the margin, in order to allow comparison of control benefits (avoided 
damages) with the costs of reducing emissions. 
There are several points that need to be made about this idea of expected 
utility.  Crucially, there is no straightforward link to anything real in the world.  Rather, 
it represents a hypothetical valuation of possible future worlds associated with some 
policy scenario, integrating the perceived likelihood of different possibilities with the 
presumed desirability of those possibilities.  As such it is a kind of judgment that can 
reasonably be expected to differ among different persons, and indeed the SR 
discusses the kinds of disagreements which might be expected to lead to different 
estimations of the value (expected utility) of a particular scenario.  The idea that even 
a single individual could have a well-defined view of the expected utility of an 
uncertain future is open to serious question.  As discussed, such projections involve 
addressing not merely processes that are well understood but uncertain (in a 
 
14
  Indeed, if non-market impacts, catastrophic risks, and high feedbacks are taken into account, the 
SR’s model calculates at least a 5% likelihood of impacts exceeding 32.5% of GDP (Stern, 2006a: 
158). 
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probabilistic sense), but processes about which we are at least partially ignorant, or 
which are indeterminate due to human choice.  The expected utility approach 
requires a world of “weak uncertainty” in which the range of possible outcomes and 
their respective probabilities are well bounded (Spash, 2002d), as opposed to one of 
“strong uncertainty” (Spash, 2002c).  Thus strong uncertainty must be reduced to 
weak uncertainty but such a move simultaneously undercuts the robustness of the 
resulting calculations. 
A fundamental justification for such reductionism is the claim that choice 
amongst alternatives requires a single scalar index of “value” to achieve a ranking.  
This conversion of all aspects of a scenario (from loss of life to the melting of the 
Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets) into quantitatively commensurable objects 
is extremely controversial.  Even supporters of such global CBA, like the SR authors, 
note that this is “problematic” (Stern, 2006a: 145-146).  There is no account taken of 
the involuntary imposition of physical harm and threat of harm to people spread 
across countries and generations.  Framing the policy question as a trade-off 
between fewer commodities and greater risk of harm to the innocent is an ethical 
decision. 
While plainly recognizing some of the issues, the SR is inconsistent in its 
treatment of the critical question about the ethical legitimacy of the conclusions 
reached by CBA.  There are a variety of gestures towards questions about the 
priority of rights, the idea of stewardship, and other non-utilitarian approaches to 
justifying climate policy, and in these sections the SR appears humble about the role 
of economic considerations in such decisions.  Yet the policy conclusions of the 
Report fail to evidence this humility; rather they assert that economic analysis has 
set the upper and lower bound on reasonable policy objectives, and that ethical 
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disputes about uncertainty, distribution and fairness can only make adjustments 
within this range.  As the SR states: 
“There will always be disagreements about the size of the risks being 
run, the appropriate policy stance towards risk, and the valuation of 
social, economic and ecological impacts into the far future.  But the 
range suggested here provides room for negotiation and debate about 
these.  And we would argue that agreement on the range stated does 
not require signing up to all of the judgements specified above.  In 
presenting the arguments, for example, we have omitted a number of 
important factors that are likely to point to still higher costs of climate 
change and thus still higher benefits of lower emissions and a lower 
stabilisation goal.” (Stern, 2006a: 299-300). 
In the section of the SR from which this is taken the authors demonstrate the 
relationship between their argument, the ethical considerations that policy must 
address, and the many relevant kinds of uncertainty.  This brings into question 
ignoring the case for a 2ºC limit on allowable warming.  The SR authors are 
asserting that people with differing values may differ on a stabilization target, but can 
only do so within the 450 to 550 ppm CO2 equivalent range.  They nonetheless admit 
to biasing their argument by omitting “a number of important factors” which would 
have supported lower targets. 
There is no specific reason given why people who reject the role of CBA in 
determining policy should accept the upper and lower ranges.  On the contrary, 
people who support the 2ºC target are simply classified as holding the target should 
be met “whatever the cost” and so economically irrational.  We suggest that the 
structure of the policy problem at hand includes an obvious asymmetry which has 
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specific implications.  Where, as a consequence of self-interested action, costs are 
imposed on others — a negative externality, in mainstream economic terms — we 
suggest that the burden of proof should be greater for arguing that a limit on pollution 
is too strict.  If our emissions limits are too lax, more people will die from climate 
harm; if they are too strict, our economies will grow more slowly and some will have 
to consume a bit less than otherwise.15 
Climate sceptics argue that the risks are in fact symmetrical.  They argue that 
given the levels of global poverty — its relationship to preventable death, health risks 
and indeed even vulnerability to climate extremes — reducing economic growth 
today will cause harm of the same moral consequence as human induced climate 
change.  That is to say, millions of people may die as a consequence of climate 
change mitigation, due to slower economic growth in poor countries.  This is an 
argument that must be taken seriously; plainly there are on the order of tens of 
millions of preventable deaths annually from causes related fundamentally to 
poverty, a number which greatly exceeds estimates of likely deaths from human 
induced climate change in the near future.  Put simply, in a world in which premature 
death is ubiquitous, there are opportunity costs to investing resources in any one 
approach to reducing it.  This is the heart of the argument made by economists such 
as Schelling (1997) and Tol (2006) as well as by as the likes of Lomborg (2006) and 
other environmental sceptics: many more lives in poor countries could be saved by 
other ways of investing the same money than will be saved by emissions mitigation. 
This is a relevant argument with regard to setting an emissions objective.  
However, turning the argument around slightly shows it is not decisive in favour of 
the sceptics.  The structure of the case can be explained as follows: Group A is 
                                                 
15
  This asymmetry could be a primary justification for the precautionary principle, though it is rarely 
articulated this way. 
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carrying out an activity (call it polluting) that causes X deaths to group B, and it would 
cost Group A $Y to eliminate those X deaths; but if Group A can reduce X deaths in 
Group B for $Z which is less than $Y but does not address the pollution problem, 
that would be morally preferable and the two groups can negotiate how to divide the 
surplus; this potentially allows more lives to be saved than by eliminating the 
pollution.  The point to this example is not that one solution is a priori right or wrong, 
but rather that neither solution is free of moral judgement or dilemma.  On one side, 
we can save more lives rather than fewer, and on the other, we choose that some 
people will die due to preventable pollution so that others might live.  We have simply 
rediscovered the basic conflict between the utilitarian intuition, that the sum of all 
harm matters, and the deontological intuition, that some categories of harm should 
just be avoided.  We might go further and raise some assessment of the democratic 
legitimacy of the process of making such a decision and the problems of who 
specifically dies being different and so on. 
This gets to the heart of the debate over the applicability of CBA to climate 
change and other risk-assessment problems.  One obvious issue is that the policy 
choice at hand—how much to reduce greenhouse pollution—is not in fact being 
debated in the context of the question “what would be the best way to save lives in 
developing countries?”  No one is saying “Instead of reducing emissions by such–
and–such a percent, we will invest in sanitation, or malaria reduction, or whatever.”  
Furthermore, since those who are most at risk are the poorest people alive today—
who are effectively absent from the policy debate—and also poor (as well as 
wealthy) people in the future, the procedural legitimacy of any decision to sacrifice 
the specific interests of those at risk from human induced climate change faces a 
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substantial challenge.  This is magnified by the fact that those who benefit most from 
the emission of greenhouse gases are today’s wealthy. 
The controversy over using CBA in this context is precisely about such issues 
as assuming we can legitimately trade lost lives for consumer goods — a dilemma 
which symbolizes debates about commensurability.  The structure imposed by 
standard economic analysis makes inevitable the reduction of lost lives to their 
equivalent in lost consumption, a move that is in many contexts and to many people 
morally indefensible, and that is indeterminate even if it is accepted as necessary.  In 
the end, the numbers produced by the SR are only meaningful if one accepts that 
the prospective human deaths (plus extinction of species and other losses) due to 
human induced climate change can be defensibly converted into equivalent amounts 
of consumption today. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Mainstream economics addresses all of the major areas of impact under the 
enhanced greenhouse effect — future generations, risk and uncertainty, extreme 
and catastrophic impacts, distributional equity — through the unjustifiable reduction 
of complexity and ethical controversy into a single scalar value.  Reasonable 
differences about choices in each of these areas lead to very wide variance in the 
possible valuation of alternative policy scenarios.  There is not and cannot be a 
‘correct’ value associated with any specific scenario nor ‘correct’ selection of a 
limited set of future scenarios.  Moreover, the claim of such reductionism to any 
authority at all depends upon the assertion that in fact the core problems of CBA—
commensurability, compensation, and the distribution of impacts—can all be 
adequately incorporated in a scientifically objective framing by an elite group of 
professional climate CBA experts.  Such authority is clearly unwarranted. 
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The SR’s authors have plainly expressed their desire to be persuasive in the 
policy debate as they perceive it.  To achieve this they have used a variety of 
methods of rhetorical and quantitative argument, but the SR’s persuasiveness also 
depends upon the social and political context and the broader credibility of its 
authors.  The credibility of mainstream economic analysis in general rests in part on 
three crucial factors: the disciplinary authority of mainstream economics in the elite 
academic world, the apparently robust quantitative measures it produces, and its 
flexibility in supporting policies desired by economic elites.  We suggest that the 
apparent insensitivity, or lip service, of standard economic analyses to relevant 
alternative considerations (eg. justice) is not simply a regrettable flaw, but rather a 
critical failure undermining the justification for giving economic analyses such a great 
weight in policy-making. 
The SR makes some effort to point out that action is supported even without 
relying upon the aggregation of all mitigation costs and benefits into a single 
comparable figure.  Nonetheless, at the heart of the analysis is a model which 
reduces uncertainty to risk and all climate impacts to a single quasi-monetary value, 
to be compared with an equivalent quasi-monetized pollution control cost.  The SR 
recognizes the fallacy of a single number approach but proceeds regardless.  Some 
carefully crafted arguments regarding the uncertainty of the results are then meant to 
justify the numbers calculated as upper and lower bounds on “reasonable” 
stabilization targets. 
Three points then need to be raised in drawing conclusions about the SR.  
First, addressing human induced climate change has created a complex political 
debate, in which there is a vast distance between parties who see effectively no 
mitigation to be warranted, and those who see extremely stringent mitigation as 
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warranted.  The extreme positions can be caricatured as those who see a global 
average temperature increase of 4ºC or more as no problem or even beneficial, and 
those who see a temperature increase of only 2ºC as an unmitigated human 
disaster.  Evidence supporting a middle path then has an air of respectability and 
political rationality, whether produced and paid for by an economic and political elite 
with vested interests of its own, whether right or wrong. 
Second, in this debate, those who oppose stringent mitigation typically speak 
in the language of economics, and oppose mitigation on the basis of projected 
financial costs.  Typically the costs highlighted are aggregated at the national level, 
especially in the USA, although some reference may be made to the global economy 
and/or particular economic sectors.  The fundamental method of reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions is perceived to be via the reduced usage and increased 
price of fossil fuel energy.  Modern economies are heavily dependent upon fossil 
fuels and stored energy in general.  The idea of controlling consumption via demand 
management is outside the political frame.  Short term costs are then intuitively 
accepted to be high for any stringent mitigation effort. 
This political economic battle ground was staked-out by the energy industry 
and the trenches dug some time ago.  In this respect perhaps there should be no 
surprise that the SR’s major “innovations” are not particularly innovative, and reflect 
work by other modellers.  Similar problems to these others are also evident in the 
treatment of catastrophes and the distribution of impacts.  Rather than innovation the 
SR delivers only highly subjective and scientifically questionable PDFs (in the case 
of catastrophic impacts), and an arbitrary multiplication factor and a gesture at 
“further research” (in the case of distributional equity).  A more thorough approach 
would likely have had the consequence of making the analysis appear less rather 
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than more robust.  In addition, the whole economic framing of the problem would 
have been brought into question. 
Third, these debates take place across communities within a political 
economy.  There is a more-or-less academic community, in which there is a 
presumption of commitment to reasoned and disinterested argument.  Then there is 
a political community in which parties are accepted to use arguments strategically, 
attempting to win support for the policies they prefer by selecting favourable 
evidence and attempting to discredit evidence which opposes their vested interests.  
The scientific foundations of human induced climate change mean that political 
actors legitimise their policy arguments on the prima facie credibility of the academic 
community, and deploy a wide range of ‘scientific evidence’.  This is plainly not the 
conduct of a disinterested truth-seeking exercise.  The approach assumes the best 
process for seeking truth is to have zealous advocates make their case and weaken 
those of their opponents in the “if you are not with us then you are against us” school 
of thought.  In this regard the primary focus on justifying the higher 550 ppm CO2 
equivalent upper limit is clearly a political statement.  
The discounting in the SR is still substantial, and the justification open to 
question on a variety of grounds.  The reduction of strong uncertainty to expected 
utility with a particular function is methodologically flawed, and even putting this to 
one side the treatment of weak uncertainty could easily justify more serious risk 
aversion.  The treatment of catastrophic risk has implausibly low damages at 
temperature increases of between 2º and 3ºC.  The sources cited by the SR for 
calibrating equity weighting justify higher possible damage adjustments.  All of these 
would argue for greater mitigation.  Yet in the end, the SR chose to place a minimum 
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stabilization level at a threshold which the authors themselves claim has at least 
even odds of exceeding a 2ºC warming. 
A close look shows many reasons why the critical issues concerning the 
enhanced Greenhouse Effect cannot be decisively resolved in any quantitative 
exercise.  Each area of the modelling process requires subjective judgments about 
likelihood and valuation which lead to large changes in the results.  Metaphorically, 
the model has a bunch of control knobs which can be turned to different settings to 
represent different views of particular concepts, mixing (for example) views about 
ethical responsibilities to future generations with views about the risk of exceeding 
some climatic threshold.  Despite the mathematical formalism, and air of objectivity 
(employed by all global CBAs), no purely scientific determination is possible for the 
settings of these knobs, and there are plausible settings of the control knobs which 
would warrant even more stringent mitigation. 
Among those most opposed to greenhouse gas regulation are the industries 
(notably oil, coal, electricity and transportation) who suspect the greatest impact will 
be on their power and profits.  These industries include many of the world’s largest 
multi-national corporations and also corporations with enormous influence in 
particular countries and over ruling governments.  Greenhouse gas regulation must 
literally be imposed against the will of many of these corporations, who can in turn 
count on popular support from politicians, consumers and workers who expect to see 
prices increase and jobs lost.  For those who most vehemently oppose mitigation on 
‘economic’ grounds, the fact that 550 ppm has been shown to be economically 
warranted will not be convincing — since they are not interested in being convinced 
— and they will continue to use the opinions of Mendelsohn, Nordhaus, Tol and their 
like to defend themselves.  The point of the SR is to enlist the prestige of economics 
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to persuade the uncommitted rather than to persuade the committed opponents of 
mitigation.  In this regard, the fact that the analysis is not robust is of minor 
importance.  No one who it intends to persuade is expected to read or understand it 
anymore than those appealing to the ad-hoc numbers produced by Nordhaus for 
twenty years have ever paid any attention to their fallibility. 
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